
The Round Table Conference (RTC) opened on November 12, 1930 and was attended by 86 delegates, which consisted of; 16 that represented the Indian Princes; 57 from British India, including Sapru, Jayakar, and Muhammad Al Jinnah; while the remaining 13 came from members of the British Parliament.[1] The conference was inaugurated by King George V and Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald, and there was a conciliatory attitude from the British delegate that inspired confidence in the Indians that some form of compromise would be achieved. That said, the British attitude was that the government would not ask the delegate to consider a new constitution prepared by the representatives of the British Parliament, but rather they should use the unique opportunity to discuss and exchange views on broad principles.[2] Ramsay Macdonald opening speech summarised the objectives of the conference in his opening speech:
‘We have met to try and register by agreement by recognition of the fact that India has reached a distinctive point in her constitutional evolution. Whatever the agreement maybe, there will be some who will say that it is not good enough or that is has gone too far. Let them say so. We must boldly come out and appeal to an intelligent and informed public opinion…And when I turn to the representatives of British India I am mindful, it is true, of India’s different communities and languages and interests, but I am reminded still more of the quickening and unifying influences which have grown from her contact with Great Britain’.[3]
Ramsay’s words, like those of all good politicians, sounded optimistic but offered little in the way of substance. While inspiring the delegates with positive rhetoric his statement continued to reflect his belief that Great Britain was a unifying element in India. His statement hinted at the chaos he believed would reign if the British left India completely. This subtext was seen by the C.P.B.G who saw the RTC as a ‘danger to world peace and socialism’,[4] and that, ‘the conference opened with pretence, which hardly deceived any sane person, that it was the starting on the job of giving the people of India their inherent and inalienable right to govern their own country’[5].
By the end of the year the Indian delegates of the RTC had returned home with high hopes for the future. It was generally believed that the British Government would transfer the reins of power to Indian hands in less than ten years. The feeling of optimism was further enhanced by the decision of Lord Irwin and the Indian Government to release Congress Leaders, including Gandhi from their incarceration.[6] In Great Britain, the end of the RTC provoked an entirely different reaction from the political classes. This study has already shown how Churchill was against the reform of India, and in October had joined the Indian Empire Society, a non-government group dedicated to preserving British rule in India.[7] As a Conservative Member of Parliament this put him in opposition to the front bench politics of his own party, who had supported the Indian policies of Lord Irwin and the Labour Government.[8] Therefore if Churchill wanted to block Indian reform he would not only have to combat the policies of the Conservative Lord Irwin, and the Labour Government, but also his own party.[9] This became increasingly difficult once the coalition Government was formed in 1931. In mid December, 1930, Churchill made a controversial speech to the Indian Empire Society which sought to undermine the faith that had been placed in Britain by the Indian delegates. Referring to Macdonald opening speech Churchill told the society that:
‘the effect of the speeches made during the five day opening session of the conference has certainly been to give the impression that a vast extension of self government is immediately contemplated and all that remains is to settle the details and method of the transference of power…..No agreement reached at the conference will be binding in any degree morally or legally…The responsibility for framing such an act will rest entirely with the government of the day, and the decision upon their proposals will rest with the House of Commons’.[10]
During his long speech Churchill challenged the authority of the Indian delegates stating that they were in no way representative if the real forces which challenges the British rule in India. Finally, perhaps the most damaging aspect of his speech can be found in his closing statements. In which he makes his views and those of the Indian Empire Society clear:
‘Above all it must be made plain that the British Nation has no intention of relinquishing its mission in India or of failing in its duty to the Indian masses…we have no intention of casting away that most truly bright and precious jewel in the crown of the King which more than all our other dominions and dependencies constitutes the glory and strength of the British Empire. The loss of India would mark and consummate the down fall of the British Empire. That great Organism would pass at a stroke out of life into history. From such a catastrophe there could be no recovery’.[11]
Churchill was clearly on the fringe politically. His views on Empire, which was shared by his fellow members at the Indian Empire Society, were deemed out of date and counter-productive by the majority of the population. This is made clear in a letter to Churchill from Lord Linlithgow, later Viceroy of India, which stated, ‘the Indian question does not interest the mass voters in this country’, to which Churchill could only reply, ‘it interests profoundly all those loyal, strong, faithful forces upon which the might of Britain depends’.[12]Churchill’s response provoked an instant rebuke from the British Premier, Ramsay Macdonald, who described Churchill’s statement as ‘mischievous from beginning to end without one constructive idea or proposal in it’.[13] He accused Churchill of damaging the possibility for peace in India and for giving the Indian National Congress the ‘opportunity of rousing up prejudice in India against the British Raj’.[14] Though Churchill was marginalised by the political parties in Britain he remained a very vocal advocate of British imperialism in India, and his voice continued to be heard throughout 1931.
1931, would prove to be an exciting and dramatic time for the Indian Independence movement. It would be marked by two key events; the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, and Gandhi’s visit to Great Britain, which consisted of the Second Round Table Conference and his much publicised visit to the Lancastrian cotton mills . In January, Gandhi was put under growing pressure to compromise from two elements within the swaraj movement. The first came from the Indian bourgeoisie businessmen whose resolve was beginning to weaken due to the effects of the civil disobedience campaigns. They held within their remit certain sections of the movement such as the urban boycott and the no tax movement but these were gradually fracturing as the civil disobedience continued.[15] This pressure perhaps highlights the concern from the C.P.G.B. that Gandhi was always quick to pander to the Indian bourgeoisie. The second call for compromise came from Sapru, Sastri, and Jayakar, who having just returned from the RTC were full of confidence, and did not want their efforts to go to ruin.[16] Pressures from both the business community and the Indian liberals finally convinced Gandhi to open a dialogue with Lord Irwin. Gandhi finally met Irwin on February 17 and reports gave the meeting mixed reviews. The Times stated that the talks invoked a ‘cautious optimism’ for the future, while Sir Sankaran Nair, who was Chairman of the Indian Commission, asked in the Statesmen magazine whether, ‘Mr Gandhi is going to repeat his egregious folly of ten years ago by attempting to lay down conditions which no self respecting government can possibly agree to’.[17] While in support of the British Nair continued, ‘let it not be forgotten also that the wonderful unanimity of English opinion behind the Prime Ministers policy is only likely to continue if there is evidence of India’s desire to take advantage of the opportunity offered’. [18]Nair’s suggestion that the majority of the British population was supportive of Indian constitutional reform fits in with this studies argument that British people considered themselves not to be the imperial masters of a vast empire, but rather as members of a large fraternity of states. This viewpoint is contrary to Churchill who typically said, ‘It is alarming and also nauseating to see Mr. Gandhi, a seditious middle temple lawyer, now posing as a fakir of a type well known in the east, striding half naked up the steps of the vice regal palace, while he is still organising and conducting a defiant campaign of civil disobedience, to parley on equal terms with the representative of the King-Emperor’[19]. This statement is further proof of Churchill’s marginalisation from mainstream politics, where his statements become less about policy, and more about sensationalism. Furthermore in another speech at the Royal Albert Hall March 18 1931, Churchill shows how out of touch he was with conservative party politics:
‘One would have thought that if there was one cause in the world which the Conservative party would have hastened to defend, it would be the cause of the British Empire in India. One would have expected that the whole force of the Conservative party machine would have been employed for months in building up a robust, educated opinion throughout the country, and in rallying all its strongest forces to guard our vital interests. Unhappily all that influence, and it is an enormous influence, has been cast the other way. The Conservative leaders have decided that we are to work with the Socialists, and that we must make our action conform with theirs’[20]
During the negotiations with Irwin, Gandhi argued for the following practical concessions; the release of the Satyagrahi’s in jail; the discharge of the Meerut prisoners; enquiries into police excesses; and the abolition of the Salt Tax.[21] On the opposite side of the negotiations Irwin argued for, among other things, the secession of the civil disobedience campaign.[22] During the negotiations Irwin clearly had superior skills, and though he congratulated Gandhi on the tactical skill in choosing salt as his main weapon, managed to triumph during the talks. On March 5, Gandhi had signed an agreement that gained very little for the Congress Party and the Independence movement, but reaped huge rewards for the government in India including the secession of the civil disobedience campaign, and a promise from Gandhi to attend a second round table conference later that year. By calling off the civil disobedience campaign Gandhi provoked criticism, not only from outside groups like the C.P.G.B. But also from within the Congress leadership, where Jawaharlal Nehru later said, ‘This is how the world ends, not with a bang but with a whimper’[23]. Perhaps the most cutting reproach came from Clemens Dutt, who wrote in May, 1931:
‘Less than year ago the National Congress, claiming to serve the national struggle and holding in practice full effective leadership, proclaimed battle with British Imperialism, with the slogan “complete Independence” from British rule on their banners, and with solemn vow never to renounce the struggle until the attainment of this goal. Millions entered the struggle; thousands have been killed; tens of thousands have been imprisoned; hundreds of thousands have undergone the violence of police and military brutality. And now the Congress have called off the struggle-for what? Not for a fraction of their previous professed aims; not for a fragment even of a strategic gain; but for permission to take part in a lickspittles’ conference that they had sworn to boycott, and assist in elaborating the details of a constitution that is to serve as new fig leaf of autocracy, that enthrones every force of, reaction and leaves every key of power in British hand’.[24]
This study would suggest that the feeling of betrayal espoused by Clemens Dutt in The Labour Monthly were indicative of the feelings that some members of the C.I.L. or the I.L.P. would have felt. But they remained silent on the matter, because they were courting favour from Gandhi and the Congress party.
Gandhi reached England in September 1931 to attend the second session of the RTC. His aims in Britain were twofold. On the one hand he was to represent Congress at the RTC, but on the other Gandhi wanted to reach the British Public, ostensibly to ascertain the real pulse of public opinion on the subject of India, thus, as Judith Brown has pointed out, Gandhi sought to activate British public opinion and parliament into forcing the Government of India to make concessions.[25] His arrival brought with it much excitement and a flurry of books on India, were published which reflect the growing interest in all things ‘Indian’. Among those books published were; Charles F. Andrew, Mahatma Gandhi at Work; Millie Polaks’s Mr Gandhi: The Man; Verrier Elwin and Jack Winslow’s The Dawn of Indian Freedom; Robert Bernay’s “Naked Fakir”; and, H.N. Brailsford’s Rebel India.[26]
Once Gandhi had arrived, instead of choosing the more ostentatious residences of the other RTC delegates, Gandhi chose the more humble abode of Kingsley Hall, which was situated deep within London’s eastend. Similar to Gandhi’s ashram in India, Kingsley Hall was established by a group of dedicated pacifists who formed a community of prayer, service, and voluntary poverty under the auspices of Muriel Lester.[27] According to Lester, Gandhi’s movements always created excitement, with large crowds accompanying him as he walked around the Eastend. According to Lester Gandhi would take time out of his busy schedual to spend with the locals asking them about their work, their lives.[28] These encounters show the positive feeling felt towards Gandhi from the working class in Great Britain which is a vast difference from the view of Gandhi which was represented in the Press.

Perhaps one of the most publicised periods of Gandhi’s time in Britain was his visit to the Lancastrian cotton mills. Prior to his visit Gandhi advocated the boycott of cheap British cotton, which contributed to a loss of 70% of British imported cotton in the years 1928-30.[29] His feelings were made clear in Hind Swaraj, arguably Gandhi’s manifesto on independence, when he wrote, ‘It is difficult to measure the harm that Manchester has done to us’. His visit received mixed reviews. The Manchester Guardian as the chief exponent of liberalism in the British press were both supportive and encouraging, while the Times chose to remain conservative and kept their reports to the economic implications of the cotton trade.[30] However among the cotton mill workers, like the working class of the East end views of Gandhi’s were positive.[31] Furthermore, Gandhi’s arrival was met with friendly faces and cheers, which shows that a certain level of understanding from the Lancastrians of the wider political implications of the Indian cotton boycott. The reason for this may lie in the fact that the political parties and groups who supported Indian reform, like the Labour party and the I.L.P. found their core strength within the industrial areas of Great Britain.
[1] Manchester Guardian, November 9, 1930, p17.
[2] Manchester Guardian, November 9, 1930, p17.
[3] Manchester Guardian, November, 13, 1930, p13.
[5] Shapurji Saklatvala, ‘The Indian Round Table Conference’.
[6] B.N. Pandey, ‘The Break up for British India’ p134.
[7] The Times, June 5, 1930, p7.
[8] Ian St. John, ‘Writing to the Defence of the Empire’ p107.
[9] Ian St. John, ‘Writing to the Defence of the Empire’ p107.
[10] Manchester Guardian, ‘December 12, 1930, p4.
[11] Manchester Guardian, ‘December 12, 1930, p4.
[12] Ian St. John, ‘Writing to the Defence of the Empire’ p116.
[13] Manchester Guardian, ‘December 12, 1930, p4.
[14] Manchester Guardian, ‘December 12, 1930, p4.
[15] Sumit Sarkar, ‘The Logic of Gandhian Nationalism’ p117.
[16] Judith Brown, ‘The Role of a National Leader: Gandhi, Congress and Civil Disobedience,’ in D.A Low’s (ed) Congress and the Raj (New Delhi: Heinemann Education Books Ltd, 1977) p138.
[17] The Times, February 18, 1931, p14.
[18] The Times, February 18, 1931, p14.
[19] James D. Hunt, ‘Gandhi in London’ (New Delhi: Nataraj Books, 1993) p176.
[21] CWMG, Vol51. 207 p140.
[22] Sumit Sarkar, ‘The Logic of Gandhian Nationalism’. p139.
[23] Judith Brown, ‘The Role of a National Leader’ p138.
[25] Judith Brown, ‘Gandhi and Civil Disobedience: The Mahatma in Indian Politics 1928-1934’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) p257.
[26] James D. Hunt, ‘Gandhi in London’ p179.
[27] James D. Hunt, ‘Gandhi in London’ p181.
[28] James D. Hunt, ‘Gandhi in London’ p190.
[29] The Times, October 1, 1931, p11.
[30] The Times, October 1, 1931, p11.
[31] James D. Hunt, ‘Gandhi in London’ p190.
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